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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §§35A-4-508(8)(a)? 78A-4-103, 63G-4-403; and
Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was the Workforce Appeals Board's decision that the Claimant was discharged
for just cause reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of whether the Employer had just cause to discharge the Claimant is
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Johnson
v. Department ofEmp't Sec, 882 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When reviewing
an agency's application of the law to a particular set of facts, the Court gives a degree of
deference to the agency and will uphold the Board's decision so long as the decision is
"within the realm of reasonableness and rationality." EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 43, <|J43. The Board's findings will be reversed "only if
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n,
939P.2dl77, 181 (Utah 1997).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though
something less than the weight of the evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ^[35 (omission in original)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, an administrative decision "meets
the substantial evidence test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the
evidence supporting the decision." Id.

An agency's findings of facts are accorded

substantial deference and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if
another conclusion may be formed from the evidence.

See Prosper Team, Inc. v.

Department of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App. 246, ^|7, citing Hurley v. Board of
Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988).
Moreover, this Court will "defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting
evidence." Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp't Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). It is not the court's "role to judge the relative credibility of the witnesses."
Id.

"It is the province of the Board, not the appellate courts, to resolve conflicting

evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is
for the Board to draw the inferences." Id.

STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim
in Addendum A, and include the following:

§35A-4-405(2), Utah Code Annotated
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code
R994-405-208, Utah Administrative Code
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce

Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department).
The Claimant, Ranae Nicol, filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits
after the Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, terminated her employment. On November 14,
2011, the Department issued a decision finding the Claimant had been discharged from
her employment with just cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits under the Utah
Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a).

(All Utah Code

provisions are found sequentially at Addendum A, Department decision at Addendum B).
The Claimant appealed the Department decision to an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). After an evidentiary hearing at which the Claimant and Employer were present,
the ALJ determined the Employer met its burden to prove it discharged the Claimant for
just cause under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2).

(Addendum C).

The Claimant

subsequently appealed that decision to the Workforce Appeals Board. The Board upheld
the decision of the ALJ. (Addendum D). The Claimant then requested reconsideration of
the Board's decision, which the Board denied. (Addendum D). The present petition for
review ensued.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
The Board supplements and corrects the Employer's Statement of the Facts as

follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Claimant worked for the Employer as a banker from June 14, 2010, until she
was discharged on October 31, 2011. (Record, 026: 9-10). The Employer's policy
describes incidents of serious misconduct it considers sufficiently egregious so as to
justify immediate discharge. (R, 012; 028: 6-10). The policy states that the Employer's
customers and employees expect "adherence to high standards of integrity, honesty, and
trust" as outlined in the policy. (Id.). Pursuant to the policy, employees are prohibited
from handling or approving transactions on their own accounts or accounts of family
members. (R, 013). This includes reversing service charges or fees. (Id.). The Claimant
received a copy of this policy on June 14, 2010, and signed an acknowledgement that she
understood she could be terminated immediately for violating the policy. (R, 015; 029:
15-18).
The Claimant maintained a joint account with her son. (R, 030: 41-44; 031: 1-11).
Sometime toward the end of September 2011 she noticed a $10 fee and a $35 overdraft
fee on the account while she was assisting another customer. (R, 031: 19-24). The
Claimant thought the fees should not have been added to the account based on the nature
of the account. (R, 031: 21-23). The $10 fee directly related to the overdraft fee. (R,
033:32-39).
The Employer expects employees who are disputing a fee on their account to
contact customer service as any customer would. (R, 027: 25-28). It is not acceptable for
an employee to reverse the fee personally. (R, 013; 027: 25-28). The Claimant, however,
approached a supervisor about the fee. (R, 031: 22-25; 032: 1-16). The supervisor told
the Claimant that if she reversed the fee on her own she did so at her own risk. (R, 031:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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23-44; 032: 13-16, 42-44). The Claimant could have called the Employer's customer
service department and asked for the fees to be reversed or instructed her son to do so.
(R, 027: 38-40).

Rather than contacting customer service, however, the Claimant

reversed the fees herself. (R, 033: 32-33). The Employer later audited the transaction
and discharged the Claimant for reversing the fees herself. (R, 028: 23-24).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Board correctly determined the Employer established just cause for its
decision to discharge the Claimant. The Employer established that its legitimate interests
were threatened by the Claimant's willful violation of its policy, that she knew her
conduct was expressly prohibited by the policy, and that she had the requisite control
over the conduct that led to her discharge. The Board's decision to deny benefits is
reasonable and rational. It is supported by substantial evidence in the record and this
Court should deny the Claimant's appeal.
On appeal to this Court, the Claimant argues the Employer failed to establish the
element of culpability and thus failed to establish just cause for its decision to discharge
her.

She does not appear to challenge the Board's determination that the Employer

satisfied the elements of knowledge and control, arguing instead that the Employer failed
to establish that its interests were so threatened by her conduct that it justified her
immediate discharge
The Employer, however, demonstrated that the Claimant willfully violated a
known, reasonable policy in reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The policy exists to ensure the Employer's employees adhere to the highest standards of
integrity, honesty, and trust. When the Claimant ignored the policy she did so at her own
peril, demonstrating dishonesty and a disregard for the Employer's interests it could not
tolerate.
The Claimant also failed to marshal the evidence to show the Board's decision is
not supported by substantial evidence, marshaling only the evidence supporting her
contention that she was discharged without just cause and ignoring any evidence contrary
to her desired outcome.

ARGUMENT
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION THAT THE EMPLOYER
DISHARGED THE CLAIMANT FOR JUST CAUSE WAS
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just cause
as defined in Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202. (See Addendum A). In establishing
whether a claimant was discharged for just cause, the employer has the burden of
proving: (1) the claimant's culpability, (2) the claimant's knowledge of expected conduct,
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control.

See Bhatia v.

Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The employer
must establish each of the three elements in order for the claimant to be denied benefits.
Id., at 577. The Claimant was discharged for violating the Employer's policy regarding
reversing fees on a personal account. An employer enjoys the prerogative to establish
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and enforce rules that further its legitimate business interests. Utah Admin. Code R994405-208. The Claimant violated such a rule in this instance.
Here, the Board found the Employer satisfied the necessary elements to establish
just cause. The Board agreed with the Employer that a single violation of a known policy
that was intended to demonstrate integrity, honesty, and trust sufficiently threatened the
Employer's legitimate interests that it necessitated the Claimant's immediate discharge.
The Claimant understood the policy and had received training in how to comply with the
policy. She also sought advice from her supervisor and was told that if she personally
reversed the fees on her account, in violation of the policy, she did so at her own risk.
A. The Employer Established the Element of Culpability
In order to demonstrate the element of culpability, the Employer must show the
conduct causing the discharge to be so serious that continuing the employment
relationship would jeopardize its legitimate interests. Utah Admin. Code R994-405202(1). The Employer met its burden in this case.
The Claimant argues the Employer failed to establish just cause for its decision to
discharge her. The Claimant argues that the ALJ and the Board erred in their analysis of
the case by failing to balance the employee's circumstances against the harm to the
Employer. The Claimant argues she is entitled to benefits under the balancing criteria
outlined in Gibson v. Department of Employment Security, wherein the Court stated that a
finding of culpability requires a "balancing of the employee's past work record, the
employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated
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against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer." Gibson, 840 P. 2d
780, 784 (Utah Ct. App 1992).
The Claimant argues specifically that she worked for the Employer for 16 months
without incident, meaning her act of reversing fees was not a pattern of misconduct. The
Claimant further argues her conduct would likely not reoccur, was not overly serious, and
did not subject the Employer to actual harm. As such, the Claimant argues, the harm to
the Employer and the seriousness of the conduct did not outweigh the Claimant's work
history, length of employment, and the likelihood that her conduct would be repeated.
The Board, however, correctly balanced the factors in this case and determined
the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the Employer's legitimate interests
such that it necessitated her immediate discharge. The culpability standard does not
require actual harm to the employer, only potential harm. Fieeiki v. Dept. of Workforce
Services, 2005 UT App. 398, ^J3. The harm to the employer may be actual or potential,
and potential harm may be shown from a single violation if that violation is sufficiently
serious or harmful. Id. lfl|3-4. In Fieeki, the Claimant, a law enforcement officer, was
discharged after domestic violence charges against him were substantiated. The Court
determined the Claimant's conduct was not an innocent mistake or an incident of poor
judgment, but rather a "volitional act with consequences of which a law enforcement
officer is, or should be, aware." Id.; ^J5; see also Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P. 2d 206,
211 (Utah 1986) ("the degree of culpability which will disqualify an employee from
receiving benefits involves volitional acts by an employee who could not have been
heedless of their consequences").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court further reasoned that while the rule states a single incident may not be
sufficient to establish the element of culpability, the use of the word "may" in the rule
"contemplates situations where potential harm could be shown from a single rule
violation." Id., 1J4, citing Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Utah 1985); see
also Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(l).

As such, the Court reasoned, "the proper

emphasis under the culpability requirement should not be upon the number of violations;
rather, it should address the problem of whether the discharge was 'necessary to avoid
actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests." Fieeki, at ]j4.
The Claimant in this instance engaged in a dishonest, volitional act with
consequences of which she could not have been heedless. The Claimant understood the
Employer's policy that employees were prohibited from handling their own account,
including reversing charges and fees. (R, 015; 032: 32-33; 035: 14-19). She received a
copy of the Employer's policy and should have known the Employer considered a single
violation of the policy to be sufficiently serious to warrant her discharge. (R, 012). The
Claimant's position required her to act with a high degree of integrity and honesty. To
this end the Employer promulgated a policy that prohibited employees from working on
their own accounts. Indeed, the policy was intended to demonstrate integrity, honesty,
and trust, both among employees and with the public, and to protect the Employer's
financial and regulatory interests. If employees were allowed to work on their own
accounts in a manner not available to the general public it could greatly damage the
Employer's reputation with its customers and adversely affect the Employer's belief the
Claimant performed her duties in an honest and transparent manner.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In this instance, the Board correctly determined the Claimant's conduct, though a
single act, was sufficiently serious that it outweighed the Claimant's work history, the
length of her time with the Employer, and the likelihood that it would happen again. The
Claimant reversed fees on the account she shared with her son, willfully violating a
known policy that she knew, or should have known, would result in her discharge. (R,
012; 013; 030; 41-44; 031: 1-11; 033: 32-33). She had been advised by her supervisor
that she did so at her own peril. (R, 031: 23-44; 032: 13-16, 42-44).
The Claimant had only worked for the Employer for little more than a year.
Though she had not violated the policy in her 16 months with the Employer, given her
disregard for the Employer's policy there is no indication in the record she would not
have violated the policy once more if she again found it inconvenient to follow the
policy. The policy is reasonable and designed to protect the Employer's rightful interests.
As such, regardless of how long the Claimant worked for the Employer, and regardless of
whether she had ever been disciplined for this sort of conduct, the seriousness of the act
coupled with the disregard for the Employer's policy and her disregard for her
supervisor's warning, gave the Employer little option other than to discharge her.
The Board's finding that the Employer established the element of culpability was
reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence.

As such, the Board's

determination that the Employer established culpability should be upheld.
B. The Employer Established the Eiements of Knowledge and Control
Though not challenged on appeal, the Board correctly determined the Employer
also established the elements of knowledge and control. In order to establish the element
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of knowledge, the Employer must show the Claimant understood the conduct the
Employer expected. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2). The Employer must also show
the Claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of her conduct. Id.
To establish the element of control, the Employer must show the conduct causing the
discharge was within the Claimant's control. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(a).
The Claimant understood the Employer's expectations. She knew, or should have
known, that the Employer's policy prohibited her conduct in this matter. (R, 012; 013).
The Claimant had been trained on and received a copy of the policy, and had also
acknowledged she understood the policy and knew she could be discharged for violating
it. (R, 015; 029: 15-18). She knew she was prohibited from handling her own account in
this manner and had been advised by her supervisor that she did so at her own peril. (R,
031: 23-44; 032: 13-16, 32-33, 42-44). When confronted by the Employer, the Claimant
admitted she knew she was not supposed to handle her own account. (R, 035: 14-19). As
such, she should have been able to anticipate the negative consequences that would result
from reversing the fees on her personal account.
The Claimant was also in control of the conduct that led to her discharge. The
Claimant was not forced to reverse the fees. She had other options. The Claimant could
have contacted customer service and asked that the fees be reversed as would any
customer. (R, 027: 25-28). Indeed, this is the Employer's expectation with regard to
employee accounts.

(Id.). The Claimant also could have asked her son to contact

customer service to address the fees. She could have altered her conduct in a variety of
ways in order to avoid being discharged.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Board's determination that the Employer established the elements of
knowledge and control was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in
the record.
II.

THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL.

In finding the Employer sustained its burden of proving the Claimant was
terminated for just cause, the Board relied on the provisions of the Employment Security
Act, the Utah Rules of Evidence, and case law. In order to successfully challenge this
finding, the Claimant "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court." Grace Drilling Co.
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court should reject the
Claimant's appeal for its failure to marshal the evidence in support of her conclusion the
findings were without foundation.

The burden is an extremely heavy one and the

Claimant has presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden.
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court refused to
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its
marshaling burden:
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead
cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton
v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden.
. . ."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the
trial court. Id. at 820. [Emphasis added]
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This Court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App.
1994):
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042.
The Court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). The Court
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to:
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bar tell, 116 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987);
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993);
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).
Oneida at 1053.
Then, after an appellant has established:
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to
support the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314.
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" Barttell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
Oneida at 1053.
The Claimant here has not met her marshaling burden. She has pointed to no
evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against the clear
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weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is supported
by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this Court held:
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the
Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 67-68.
In the recent unemployment case of Target Interact US, LLC v. Workforce
Appeals Bd., 2010 UT App 255 this Court noted the employer failed to marshal the
evidence on appeal stating:
we note that Target's briefing is deficient in several respects and that these
defects alone would be grounds for this court to decline to disturb the
Board's decision. Of particular concern is Target's failure to marshal the
evidence in support of the Board's decision. See generally Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007
UT 42, P 17, 164 P.3d 384 & n.3, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ("To
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party must
marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Target's
central disagreement with the Board's decision is factual, and Target's
failure to marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision
impermissibly shifts the burden of combing the record for supporting
evidence onto this court.
In a separate concurring opinion in Target, Judge Voros wrote:
I concur in the result and in that portion of the memorandum
decision concluding that Target's briefing does not satisfy the
requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While
I agree that Target's claims of error lack merit, I would affirm on the
ground that they are inadequately briefed.
The Claimant in this case also failed to meet her marshaling burden.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should find the substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's
determination the Claimant was discharged for just cause and is therefore ineligible for
benefits. The Employer successfully established the elements of culpability, knowledge,
and control. The Claimant also failed to marshal the evidence in support of her appeal.
The Board's decision was reasonable and rational. As such, the Board requests the Court
deny the Claimant's appeal and affirm the Board's decision.
Respectfully submitted this

of September, 2012.

JAMESON R. MAUGHfAN
Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATIONS

I CERTIFY that the foregoing Respondent's Brief complies with the type-volume
limitations. It uses proportionally spaced typeface and contains 4,009 words.

Jaceson R. Maughan
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, postage
prepaid, to the following this /^T^day of September 2012.

SAM N PAPPAS
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES INC
8 EAST BROADWAY STE 500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
WELLS FARGO BANK
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC
PO BOX 7340
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725

*JL
rceson R. Maughan'
Attorney for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

ADDENDUM A
Utah Workforce Services Code
Employment Security Act
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits.
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(1) (a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause,
if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed
services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves work
under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.
(c) Using available information from employers and the claimant, the division shall
consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the
extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in
reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and
good conscience.
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant who has left work
voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or in a new locality does
so without good cause for purposes of Subsection (1).
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act
or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the division,
and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.
(b) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for dishonesty constituting a
crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with the claimant's work as shown
by the facts, together with the claimant's admission, or as shown by the claimant's conviction
of that crime in a court of competent jurisdiction and for the 51 next following weeks.
(c) Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base period, and are not available
for this or any subsequent claim for benefits.
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ADDENDUM A
35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law
judge — Division of adjudication — Workforce Appeals Board —
Judicial review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure.

(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued,
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which
action any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be
made a defendant.
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63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with
the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
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ADDENDUM A
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue
all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session
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ADDENDUM A
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance.
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits.
R994-405-201.
Discharge - General Definition.
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining the
date the employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for just
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime,
which was deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest.
However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A just cause
discharge must include some fault on the part of the claimant. A reduction of force is
considered a discharge without just cause.
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be
satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the employment
relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct was an isolated
incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be continued or repeated,
potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor
in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in
judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a single violation, even though
harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with an established pattern of
complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the
conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future
harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. There
does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, it must
be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct.
Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation
of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a
universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given
an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have been
followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions,
including criminal actions.
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(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not sufficient
to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness
or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may
satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While such a
circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits will be denied.
To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work
performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a
satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to meet the job
requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a discharge results, just
cause is not established.
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ADDENDUM A
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance.
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits.
R994-405-208.

Examples of Reasons for Discharge.

In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in
determining eligibility for benefits . . .
(1)

Violation of Company Rules.

If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established,
benefits will be denied.
(a)
An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or that
infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. If
a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally has the responsibility to
discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct contrary to the rule,
thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those concerns. When rules are
changed, the employer must provide appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable
opportunity to comply.
(b)
If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract
or collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the discharge is
consistent with the provisions of the contract.
(c)
Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a claimant
was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further violations may result in
a denial of benefits.
(d)
Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's
ability to maintain necessary discipline.
(e)
Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior
warning to support a disqualification.
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
DECISION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

ADDENDUM B

DCVP

DATE MAILED: 11/14/11

RANAE NICOL

SSN:

4445 w 4715 S
KEARNS UT 84118-4742

XXX-XX-X832

EMPLOYER: WELLS FARGO BANK

Notice: This decision is made on your claim for benefits:
You

were discharged from your job for not following a reasonable policy, rule or instruction from your employer.

You were discharged from your job for just cause. Your conduct was within your control and was adverse to your employer's
rightful interests. You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your employer or your employer's expectations and you knew or
should have known the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer.
Benefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the*Utah Employment Security Act beginning October 30, 2011 and ending
when you have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are
otherwise eligible. To reopen your claim, you can file on-line at jobs.utah.gov or you can call the Claim Center. This reopening will
be effective as of the week you reopen your claim. You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim.
RIGHT TO APPEAL: If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to: Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals
Section, PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244, or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online atwww.jobs.utah.gov. Your appeal must
be in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before November 29, 2011. An appeal received or postmarked after
November 29, 2011 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established. Your appeal must be signed by you or
your legal representative. MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS. Also, please state the reason for your appeal. A copy of your appeal will be
sent to any other interested parties. It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is
pending. You will not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing.

UTAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS: S.L.: 526-4400, Ogden: 612-0877, Provo: 375-4067, Out of Area: (888) 848-0688.
REPR. K Hintze

EMP.#: 1000562

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
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ADDENDUM C
Han APDEC
04

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPEALS SECTION
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant

Respondent

RANAE N1COL
4445 W 4715 S
KEARNS UT 84118-4742

WELLS FARGO BANK
%BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC
PO BOX 7340
GARDEN CITY NY i 1530-0725

S,S,A,NO;

XXX-XX-4832

APPEAL DECISION:

CASE NO:

ll-A-18336

The Department's decision is affirmed.
The Claimant is denied unemployment benefits.
The Employer is relieved of charges.

CASE HISTORY:
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

Claimant/Employer
35A-4-405(2)(a)
35A-4-307
-

Discharge
Employer Charges

The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant
was discharged for just cause. The decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for
benefits paid to the Claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless, within 30 days from December 7, 2011,
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://wwwjobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal is made.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment benefits the Claimant worked as a banker for Wells Fargo Bank
from June 14, 2010, through October 31, 2011, At the end of the employment the Claimant was earning
SI5.24 an hour.
The Claimant received the Employer's policy and procedures. The Code of Conduct policy prohibited
employees from handling transactions on their own accounts or account of relatives. The policy stated
that reversing service charges or fees was not allowed on your own accounts or that of relatives.
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At the end of September 2011, the Claimant noticed that the joint account she shared with her son had a
$10 fee and a $35 overdraft fee on the account. The Claimant asked a supervisor about the fees on her
son's account. The Claimant expressed that there should not be the $10 service fee because it was a
member's account and that if the fee would not have been charged, the account would have not been
overdrawn and the overdraft fee would have not been assessed. The supervisor told her that that she
could reverse the fees but she would do it at her own risk. She could have called the customer service
account line as any other customer would to request the fees be reversed. The transaction was audited
and the Claimant was discharged for violating the policy.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Discharge
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the
employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the employee involved. The
unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) provide in pertinent part:
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be
satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the employment
relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct was an
isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be continued or
repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an
important factor in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good
faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a single
violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with an
established pattern of complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending on
the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge the
claimant to avoid future harm,
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. There
does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, it must
be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the
conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear
explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a
violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should
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have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had
a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally
must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very
severe infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency,
repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a
similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to
perform satisfactorily.
R994-405-208.

Examples of Reasons for Discharge,

In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in
determining eligibility for benefits.
(1)

Violation of Company Rules.

If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established,
benefits will be denied.
(a)
An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or
that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be
reasonable. If a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant generally has the
responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct
contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those
concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must provide appropriate notice and
afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply.
(b)
If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract or
collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the discharge is
consistent with the provisions of the contract.
(c)
Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a
claimant was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further violations
may result in a denial of benefits.
(d)
Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's
ability to maintain necessary discipline.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C

ADDENDUM (J
RanaeNicol

-4-

ll-A-18336

(e)
Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior
warning to support a disqualification.
Culpability is established. The Employer had reasonable expectations for the Claimant to follow the
Code of Conduct policy. The policy was in effect so that employees could not work on their own
account. The Claimant working and reversing charges on her own account was harmful to the
Employer. The fees were not investigated independently. The failure to follow the policy was harmful
to the Employer's policy and ability to trust the Claimant. The Employer discharged the Claimant to
avoid any further harm to its interests.
Knowledge is established. The Claimant knew or should have known the Employer's expectations.
She knew the policy and was warned that reversing the fees was risky. She should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect and possible consequences of her conduct based upon the statement by the
supervisor.
Control is established. The Claimant had the ability to follow the Employer's expectations. Knowing
that the Employer expected her not to handle transactions on her own accounts and having been warned
it wasrisky,she should have refrained from working on her own account.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, all three elements of just cause are established and benefits
are denied.
Employer Charges
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(2) of the Utah Employment
Security Act. The Claimant's separation is disqualifying, and the Employer is relieved of charges.
DECISION AND ORDER:
Discharge
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied
effective October 30, 2011, and continuing until the Claimant has worked and earned at least six times
her weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment and is otherwise eligible.
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Employer Charges
The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section
35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

c

^

—

Heather Simonson
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued:

December 7,2011

HS/tc
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Form BRDEC

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

Issue 04

RANAE NICOL, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-4832

:
:

WELLS FARGO BANK,
EMPLOYER

Case No. ll-B-01808

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
The Employer is relieved of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated December 7, 2011, Case No. ll-A-18336, the Administrative Law Judge
affirmed the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant
effective October 30, 2011. The Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, was eligible for relief of benefit
charges in connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: December 16, 2011.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(2)(a)?

2.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for the Employer as a banker from June 14, 2010, until she was discharged
on October 31, 2011.. The Employer's policy prohibits employees from handling transactions on
their own accounts or the accounts of relatives. The policy specifically prohibits employees from
reversing charges or fees on their accounts or the accounts of relatives. The Employer considers a
single violation of this policy to be sufficient grounds for discharge.
The Claimant maintained a joint account with her son. Sometime toward the end of
September 2011, she noticed a $10 fee and a $35 overdraft fee on the account. The Claimant did not
feel the $ 10 fee should have been added to the account because of the nature of the account. The $ 10
fee directly resulted in the overdraft fee. The Claimant approached a supervisor about the fee. She
claims she asked her supervisor if she could reverse the fee and was told that if she reversed the fee
she did so at her own risk. The Claimant could have called the customer service department and
asked for the fees to be reversed. Rather than doing so, however, the Claimant reversed the fee
herself. The Employer later audited the transaction, discharging the Claimant when it discovered
she had reversed the fee herself.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer established just cause for its decision to
discharge the Claimant.
The Claimant offers no substantive argument on appeal, arguing only that the Administrative Law
Judge's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Claimant requested a copy of the
transcript in order to prepare her written argument. She was sent a copy of the transcript on
January 4, 2012, with a letter instructing her that her written argument must be submitted within ten
days from the date of the letter. The Claimant's written argument was due by January 14, 2012, so
that it might be considered by the Board when the Board convened on January 17, 2012, at 10:00
a.m. The Claimant's written argument was not faxed to the Board until January 17, 2012, at 8:37
p.m., well after the Board met to consider the Claimant's appeal. As such, the Claimant's written
argument in support of her appeal was not considered in reaching this decision.
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.
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The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
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good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the Employer must satisfy all three elements of the
just cause standard. Here, the Employer satisfied the necessary elements to show just cause.
To establish culpability, the Employer must show the Claimant's conduct was so serious that
continuing their relationship would jeopardize the Employer's rightful interests. The Claimant was
discharged for violating the Employer's policy regarding handling transactions on her own account.
The policy exists to protect the Employer's financial and regulatory interests and it has a legitimate
interest in its employees following the policy. The Employer considers compliance with the policy
to be such a serious matter that it discharges employees for a single violation of the policy. Though
the Claimant violated the policy only once, her conduct sufficiently jeopardized the Employer's
interests that it necessitated her immediate discharge. The Employer established the element of
culpability.
To establish the element of knowledge, the Claimant must have an understanding of the conduct
expected by the Employer. The Claimant knew that reversing the charges on her own account was
contrary to the Employer's expectations. The Claimant knew that she was prohibited from handling
her own account and was specifically warned by her supervisor that she could reverse the charges
on her account at her own risk. The Claimant also understood the Employer's policy and, when
confronted by the Employer, admitted that she knew she was not supposed to handle her own
account. The Claimant also specifically testified that she knew about the policy and decided to
proceed despite her supervisor's warning that she did so at her own peril. She should have been able
to anticipate the negative consequences that would result from reversing the fees on her account in
violation of the Employer's policy. The Employer established the element of knowledge.
The Claimant was in control of the conduct that led to her discharge. She could have avoided being
discharged in a variety of ways. The Claimant could have contacted the customer service
department. She could have asked her son to contact the Employer or the customer service
department. She also could have heeded her supervisor's warning and simply refrained from
reversing the fees on her account. The Employer established the element of control.
The decision denying benefits is affirmed. The Board adopts the Administrative Law Judge's
reasoning and conclusions of law in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective October 30, 2011, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, is affirmed.
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The Employer, Wells Fargo Bank, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this
claim, as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63G-4-302(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to each party
by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an order within
20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be
denied pursuant to §63G-4-302(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. It is not
necessary to file a request for reconsideration if you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. If a request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue
another decision. This decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of
Appeals and time limitation for such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63G-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ORCE APPEALS BOARD
Date Issued: January 18, 2012
TH/CN/DW/HS/JM/cd
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this
18th
day of January, 2012, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
LORI JOHNSON
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
205N 400W
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103-1125
RANAE NICOL
4445 W 4715 S
KEARNSUT 84118-4742
WELLS FARGO BANK
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES
PO BOX 7340
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

Issue 04

RANAE NICOL, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-4832
Case No. 12-R-00062
RECONSIDERATION
WELLS FARGO BANK,
EMPLOYER

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a letter received on January 20, 2012, the Claimant, Ranae Nicol, requested reconsideration of the decision
of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on Januaiy 18,2012. The decision of the Workforce Appeals
Board was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge after a formal hearing.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63G-4302(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within the meaning and intent of that
section of law.
DECISION:
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board dated
January 18, 2012, remains in effect.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in writing within
30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the fifth floor of the Scott M.
Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal
must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the
proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah
Employment Security Act; §63G-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and
24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ORCE APPEALS BOARD

Date Issued: February 8, 2012
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 8th day of February, 2012, by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
United States mail to:
RANAE NICOL
4445 W 4715 S
KEARNSUT 84118-4742
LORI JOHNSON
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
205 N 400 W
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103-1125
WELLS FARGO BANK
C/O BARNETT ASSOCIATES INC
PO BOX 7340
GARDEN CITY NY 11530-0725

Qsh&klujJk1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wuv, U O l i
1V8B/2B11

16:20

ADDENDU

w. m

1:17PM
8022972001

WELLS FARGQ

I WELLS FARGO

PAGE 03705

IMTERNETSEllflnCES GROUP
HurrvuN Resource Policy

Reasons far Immadtaf0 ^voluntary Termination

SEROUS MISCONDUCT
As employees of Wells Fargo Bank (Bank), wa am responsibla for fsfegiiatdlitfj confidential
information relative fo customers' (Including fellow employees') finances. In addition, our
customers and feBoW e m p l o y e s expwt adherence to high standards of intej % honesty, and
bust from the Bank, Employee responsibilities* Bank Policies, and Praccdure,;i /*ddr»*sihg the
handling pf 6or business are outlined In the Handbook for Wells Forgo T&am M&mbers and
Handbook for Wells Fen?o Supvrvi&orz m th* following sactbna:
•

Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (Appendix A)
Leaving Wells Fargo Involuntary Terminations (Qhaplur 9)

When reviewing those Handbooks, pleaae pay specia] attention to the vjolafjc T# considered a*
"Serious Misconduct", The violations listed constitute groundsfor?rnrn*dfaty tovofimtery
tercnFnatfon of your empfoyment
The Purpose of this document is to increase amploys* awareness and imderiftcincfing of the
acfions thst violate fhft Bank's exiting policies.
If upon investigation, it k conffrrhod that you engaged In activities considered 'Svrfous
Misconduct* by the eank/Graup/OrVision, your empfoymont may be Immediately involuntarily
lerrpmatjsd.
Examples pondered acts of "Serious Mispondi/cf are listed balow. Please review this
document carefuQy, It Is important to understand that the items below SWY& <;flly a s examples
and do not encompass all of the reasons for immediate Involuntary termfrwiWcna.
1 Intentional MSsU**Df the Telephone

" ~

~~]

Listed below are actions c e n t e r e d a s "Serious Misconduct*, Examples of nfeuse occur whan
I an e m p l o y e deliberately:
•
'
«
J*
•

Disconnects a customer
Tr^nfcfars a rail back Into the queue without first sckncwtedsiing or servicrjfj, a customer
Uses the Conference Button inappropriately
Places a customer on hold than makes/engages in a personal call
Makes or receives personal oalte on job time

f
I

AJso, Intentions) Misuse of ihe Telephone to create a fake statistical wcord (i e,, altering Aver30$
) Handle Time statistics) represent? an "Act of Dishonesty".
.
^
j

April 1997 revised August 15,2007
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Transactions and Approval Polity Violations
Transactions
Employes are not to band!* oi approve transactions on their own accounts), ociMunis of
relatives or members of their household, bcludlng roommates and other unrelated Individuals,
Exahtples of these transactions are:
i
l » Change of address
• Increasing AtMcpodrtHmils
• Changing overdraft (OD) hmft. codes
• . Changing the number of ou occurrence
* RBversintf &ervk# charges or tees, I.e., Pricing: Employees are not to vtew tolr own
sccount($) while logged onto the Pricing 309 screen, as to oxit this scr&fcn requires them to
I
"price their own accounts*. Should ym Yi&w your accounts) whiW logged or *> PndnQ, frk
action mu5( be sported to a supervisor immediately,
I As a courtesy, center employees are permitted to access their accounts for Information
purposes only within center goidelintts.
Approvals
If a transaction requires approval, the approval m\ut com** irom tha no*t higher ovol of authority.
An employee may not request approval of personal transactions by a peer or by a subordinate
who reports \o \hen\. For example, a supervisor cannot ask another supervisor to twersz and/or
approve their overdrafts and fees* The supervisor should ask their manager or uriy 'nexMtfgfw*
lever manager to do their transactions for thern. An agent cannot approach anoihter agent and j
I ask tham to reverse fees po their account^), The agent should ask thefr superv'scvr ox any *nextI higher-level" supervisor to do their transaction for them, (These actions constitute '"favors" for
I friends and co-workers),
I UfiMUthvrtzed Access to Account R&conSs
To aoows a customer's account without their approval (including fellow employees;, family
members, and persons with whom there is/was personal involvement) for any reason (e.gM to
obtain another employee's tele phone numbers, birthday, address, etc; to looK u o (ho account
balance of a celebrity or another employe) is ayaih&t Bank policy.

I

I

Alternated ToJlar MaoWnzs [ATM) Transactions

I

Makingfictiliou? ATM depostts to receive cash (e.g., empty ATM envelope deposit*, tfaposlUng
checks drawn against Insufficient funds via the ATM, including on paydays prior h> the availability
1 of funds) Is against Bank policy*
Subrouting false ATM claims of any amount (including thosa under $25.00 or tes) is a violation of
frank policy as Well as illegal. Although tha Bank doe* not question thosQ transitions as a
matter of practice, reports of ATM claim* are generated and reviewed by the Bank's Audffing
I Department Wh»n trends an* noted, they are investigated and, \f confrme^, cai&Muto
ITTBUdulentActfyif/.

Fate* Bank Ksconis (Porsonmf)
Fals'rfying t»mwh w i s or attendant* records to o>t paid for time not vrorked te a|pin*t Bank

1 pqfcy.

m

„ w ~—; —
April 1S97 revlstid August 15,2007
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Reasons for Immediate Involuntary Tennittatlon

TEAM MEMBER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I have read this document and understand that my employment may to immpdiatyl)' and
involuntarilyterminatedshould I engage In any activities defined and considened art "Reasons for
Immediate Involuntary Torminatiorr by the Bank, Orwp, and/of DMslon,

Eniptoyte Name(pleasei pnVt)

Employee Signaiure

\

— —

g^fe
Date

^y

^

Employee ID Number

Supervisor Name

April 1997 revise il August 15,2007
4
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JONES

I am a service manager.

JUDGE

What was the claimant's job there?

JONES

She was a banker.

JUDGE

What were her dates of employment, the first date she worked and the last?

JONES

Um her initial hire date was June the 14, 2010. Um the date that she was released
from the company was October 3st of 2011.

JUDGE

Was she discharged from the job?

JONES

Uh, yes she was.

JUDGE

What was her rate of pay at the time of termination?

JONES

At the time it was 15 dollars and 24 cents per hour.

JUDGE

Why was she terminated?

JONES

She was terminated for a violation of the code of ethics policy?

JUDGE

What is the code of ethics policy?

JONES

The code of ethics policy is, as indicated here in the exhibit, it basically covers
many different things but in particular, related to this case, would be crediting fees
back on your own personal account or that of a close family member.

JUDGE

Okay, which exhibit is that?

JONES

Let me look at it here, I have two copies here, I'm sorry. I believe it is—

HEBDA

Judge Simonson, can I give the page number? Is that appropriate?

JUDGE

Yes, go ahead.

CLAIMANT

Page 13 is specific to the—under transactions.

JUDGE

Which exhibit number? Is that Exhibit 13?

CLAIMANT

It's Exhibit 13, that's what I meant. Yes, I'm sorry. It's the second page of the
policy but 13 is the number.
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JUDGE

Is that the policy you're referring to, Mr. Jones?

JONES

Yes it is.

JUDGE

Okay. So go ahead and read the policy she violated into the record.

JONES

Okay it says on Exhibit 13 under Transactions, "Employees are not to handle or
approve transactions on their own accounts, accounts of relatives or members of
their household including roommates and other unrelated individuals. Examples of
these transactions are change of address, increasing ATM credit limits, changing
overdraft limit codes, changing the number of overdraft occurrences, reversing
service charges or fees—for example, pricing. Employees are not to view their own
accounts while logged into the pricing 309 screen as to exit this screen requires
them to price their own account. Should you view your accounts while logged into
this pricing, this action must be reported to your supervisor immediately."

%

And the one in question would be the initial listing reversing service charges or
fees.
JUDGE

What occurred?

JONES

Ranae was found to have reversed some service fees on her own personal account
or that of a relative. At the time it was discovered she was - she discussed the
matter with our internal investigator and at that time she admitted that she had
made those changes to her account which, as the policy states here, is not to be
done by an employee.

JUDGE

And what was the fee that was reversed?

JONES

I don't have the copies of the actual fees but it was a fee related to her account,
either an overdraft or a service fee. The investigators didn't provide me with a copy
of the exact fees that were in question, only to say that it was a fee on a personal
account which should not have been reversed.

JUDGE

And if there is a fee she was contesting on an account, on her own account or a
relative's account, what should she have done?

JONES

The correct policy is for her or the relative to contact customer service as any other
customer would and discuss the matter with them and have it resolved based on
current policies and procedures as any customer normally would.

JUDGE

Did she approach a supervisor about that?

JONES

Um at the time when we discussed it with the investigator she did not say that she
5
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had. The only information that was given at that time was that she had entered her
own account and made the adjustments.
I
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JUDGE

Why was it necessary to discharge her for this instead of giving her a warning?

JONES

Um basically accessing your own account and making charges is considered serious
misconduct. And I suppose could have lasting, you know, impacts on the bank if
people were able to make their own adjustments to their own accounts - you know,
pretty much any time they wished. And so that is considered one of the serious
misconducts which can result in termination on the first offense.

JUDGE

Her appeal letter says this was a ten dollar monthly fee that was placed on a team
member account which should not have had a fee. And so she reversed it. Is that
correct, that there shouldn't be a fee on a team member account?

JONES

Team member accounts are not generally assessed fees but there are certain rules
and regulations and some fees can be assessed depending on what type of fee and
things like that. In this case I don't have the record of which exact fee was
reversed.

JUDGE

Did you speak to her about this matter when it occurred?

JONES

I did not. This matter was uncovered through a normal routine audit and was
brought to me through our investigations department. I was involved only because I
was the reporting manager of the individual being questioned.

JUDGE

Did she ever bring up that she asked a supervisor for authority to do so - reverse the
fee?

JONES

Not to me, no.

JUDGE

Any questions, Ms. Hebda, for Mr. Jones?

HEBDA

Yes. Mr. Jones, now you said there was an internal investigator that questioned the
claimant. Is that correct?

JONES

That's correct.

HEBDA

Were you present then, were you listening to the conversation?

JONES

I was; I was present in the room sitting next to Ms. Nicol.

HEBDA

Okay. What exactly did she say when she was told that it was found that she had
reversed fees?
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JONES

Um the best of my recollection is I was sitting next to her when she was asked if
she had made, you know, made the reversal of the fees. She said yes, I did that and
I realize I shouldn't have. And that's kind of where the conversation ended. And
then the investigator, at that point, you know, just kind of thanked us and wrapped
up the meeting and asked us to return to our normal duties.

HEBDA

Okay. So she did acknowledge she should not have done that.

JONES

Yes, she did.

HEBDA

How did you know she was aware of the written policy that you just read into the
record which is, I believe, it's Exhibit 13.

JONES

Um the policies are covered during initial training when a banker is hired. It's
covered in depth and as we have on -1 believe it's 15 bankers are required at that
point to agree that they have read and understand the policies and of course
acknowledge that through their signature and the date of that policy.

HEBDA

Okay and you testified earlier that um often times team members are not to be
served—or, I'm sorry, not to be charged a ten dollar service fee. And if she had
been in error, if she had been in error, is it okay to fix that herself or to reverse it
herself?

JONES

It's not. Even though it may have been in error if it was on the account, there is a
proper channel and it would have been taken care of and removed promptly
because it was a team member account with no question by our normal customer
service procedures. But it's not acceptable to do that on your own.

HEBDA

Okay. I don't have any other questions at this time.

JUDGE

The claimant also says she was discharged for hanging up on a customer. Was she
discharged for that reason?

JONES

She was not.

JUDGE

Any additional questions, Ms. Hebda?

HEBDA

Not at this time, thank you.

JUDGE

Any questions, Ms. Nicol, for Mr. Jones?

CLAIMANT

Um, I don't have any questions for him, no.

7
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JUDGE

Ms. Nicol, we'll come to you now. What was your job with the employer?

CLAIMANT

I was a banker.

HEBDA

I'm having a hard time hearing the claimant, I'm wondering if she could speak up.

CLAIMANT

I was a banker.

JUDGE

What were the dates you worked there, the first day and the last day?

CLAIMANT

Urn June 14th of 2010 and October 31 st of 2011.

JUDGE

What was your rate of pay at the end of the employment?

CLAIMANT

$ 17.24 an hour. Oh $ 15.24 an hour, I'm sorry.

JUDGE

Were you discharged from the job?

CLAIMANT

Yes I was.

JUDGE

Were you told why you were being discharged?

CLAIMANT

Iwas.

JUDGE

What were you told?

CLAIMANT

I was told that I had reversed a fee. But the - you know, which I knew I had done
that. But I felt very intimidated by Ron and the security person and I was in tears.
And I don't understand how he could say that everything was so calm and
everybody was nice because I was very upset. I didn't want to write the statement
and I didn't know 1 had the option to write the statement or sign it.

JUDGE

So what account was this?

CLAIMANT

It was on my son's account.

JUDGE

How old is your son?

CLAIMANT

Mysonis21.22.

JUDGE

Are you a co-signer on that account?

CLAIMANT

Yes, ma'am.
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JUDGE

So it's also your account?

CLAIMANT

Urn—

JUDGE

If you're a co-signer.

CLAIMANT

Yes.

)

JUDGE

Okay. So it's your account and your son's.

CLAIMANT

It's my son's account and mine, yes.

JUDGE

Okay so what happened?

CLAIMANT

I went on—we were helping customers on the phone, sometimes in order to guide
them through the internet, we can't log onto their account that would be a violation
of privacy. So we have to log into our own.

)
i

I had been helping a customer on their internet account and I had pulled up mine
and I had seen that my son's account had been charged a ten dollar fee and
additionally an overdraft fee of 35 dollars. I did go to a supervisor and I asked (one
unintelligible word) in this situation if the fees - you know, the fees shouldn't have
been charged. And the response that I got was do it at your own risk. Now, risk to
me—I didn't know if I was risking a write-up, there was nothing said you know, I
mean, he certainly could have taken the call. Um—
JUDGE

So why didn't you call him? Why did you walk over?

CLAIMANT

Because our supervisors are—the way that it's set up is we sit in certain areas with
supervisors but my supervisor, Eric, was not there that day. And so I went and
asked another supervisor.

JUDGE

Okay. So he said do it at your own risk. Why didn't you call a customer service line
if you had a question or a concern on your own account?

CLAIMANT

Because I trusted my supervisor. I didn't think that he was going to lead me into a
direction to get me fired.

JUDGE

Okay but he said don't—do it at your own risk. That means there's a potential
problem with you doing it. So why didn't you say okay, what's the right way to do
it then?

CLAIMANT

Well because at that point he turned away and said, just, you know that was the
whole conversation.
9
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JUDGE

Okay, who was the supervisor?

CLAIMANT

Um,itwasMikeBarr.

JUDGE

MikeBarr?

CLAIMANT

Mmhm.

JUDGE

Okay. So you approached him and you said there was a fee that you didn't agree
with and what did you ask him?

CLAIMANT

I said there is a fee on my son's account that is a big error. And you know, I don't
know what to do. The fee is $45, it's not a—you know. I didn't - 1 said it's $45 and
he said, well go ahead and do it at your own risk. And that's all that was said. And
so I did that. And you know, if he had said, transfer it to me or - you know, or -

JUDGE

Transfer what to him? You didn't have anything to transfer to him.

CLAIMANT

Well if he had come over and looked at it I could have had him take care of it
himself, you know. Perhaps -maybe he just didn't want to know. I don't know
what he was thinking at that moment.

JUDGE

What date did you do this?

CLAIMANT

I don't remember the day. At the end of September. I was just coming off a twomonth medical leave.

JUDGE

Did you know there was a policy against working on your own accounts or a family
member's account?

CLAIMANT

I did know there was a policy but that's why I went to a supervisor for clarification
and for help. Had I known that I was risking my job I would never have done it. I
loved my job at Wells Fargo. In fact the same day that I got terminated I had got a
third quarter, you know, standard of excellence award with my customers, of going
above and beyond to help them.

JUDGE

Okay, so when you spoke to the initial adjudicator you told them that the statement
that Mike gave you was different. You told hem "you can do it, but I hope you
don't get caught." So which one—what did Mike really say?

CLAIMANT

It was ' do it at your own risk' because that's -. You know, when the adjudicator
called I was very flustered and frightened and, you know, I just felt like I had been
totally wrong and that there was no other way around it, but 10
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JUDGE

When you initially filed for unemployment benefits why did you say you were fired
for failing a QA?

CLAIMANT

Because that's how they discovered the call. Because I had heard about both of
them, about hanging up on a customer who was being abusive and then I had also
heard about this reversing the fee.

JUDGE

Did you appeal this internally?

CLAIMANT

With Wells Fargo?

JUDGE

Yes.

CLAIMANT

No. I didn't know I could. (Pause) I was never given that option. Looking back on
it, I would never have done it. It's -not once would I have had to go through for the
last month with no money and you know, I can't even get paid for the last three
weeks that I was on disability because the company is having some issues with my
doctor. So it's been really difficult.

JUDGE

And why not just call or have your son call in if there was a concern on his
account?

CLAIMANT

Because my son works as a police officer. He's working the night shift and he'd
was - been working like 60 hours a week. He was just inundated with stuff. And I
realize that I should have said, you know, you'll have to do this, I'm sorry, but had I
known it was risking myjob I would never have done it. Not over ten dollars, that's
ridiculous.

JUDGE

So did you reverse the ten dollars or the 4'5 dollars?

CLAIMANT

I reversed the ten and there was an overdraft that had been charged because of the
ten dollar fee.

JUDGE

So did you reverse the overdraft fee?

CLAIMANT

I did.

JUDGE

Okay, so you reversed 45, not ten dollars.

CLAIMANT

Right. Right.

JUDGE

Okay. Anything else, Ms. Nicol?

%

>
>
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CLAIMANT

No, no.

HEBDA

On your son's account?

CLAIMANT

On other accounts.

HEBDA

Okay. Now why didn't you then say to this supervisor, would you do that for me
since it's against policy? Would you please reverse this fee for me?

CLAIMANT

I, at that moment, was not thinking of policy. You know, I just—that's why -1 was
confused about it, that's why I asked.

HEBDA

Okay. But when you were confronted by the investigator and with Mr. Jones
present, isn't it true that you admitted that you knew—you said to them, I know I
shouldn't have done that. I know that that was wrong.

CLAIMANT

Right. And I did say that. Because, you know, I was figuring I was going to get
written up.

HEBDA

So you knew you were doing something wrong when you did it.

CLAIMANT

But I asked a supervisor for guidance—

HEBDA

And, and—

CLAIMANT

And that was the advice that I got.

HEBDA

And the guidance you got was that you were taking a risk, correct? And isn't it true
that you decided to take that risk?

CLAIMANT

Because I was told that I could do it at my own—to do it at my own risk.

HEBDA

And you chose to take the risk.

CLAIMANT

That was not giving me guidance to say hey, you can't do that. That was not saying,
you know, transfer it to someone else. That was not saying that he would look at it
and see what he could do.

HEBDA

Okay.

CLAIMANT

He just—it was more of like, he didn' t want to know.

HEBDA

Well—and you didn't ask anybody to do it for you, did you?
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